All Advisory Opinions At-A-Glance

Under the Compact a “non-adjudicated” juvenile sex offender sentenced under a “plea and abeyance” order, but assigned to report to the Attorney General’s Office without any special conditions or a probation officer being assigned, and who seeks to transfer to another state is subject to the provisions of the ICJ, if the order not only requires compliance with all laws but whose sentence also includes provisions which, for example, require completion of other terms and conditions such as a sex offender treatment or counseling modification program.  Such a juvenile is not in actuality an “unsupervised juvenile” even though there are no special conditions or the assignment of a probation officer.

As such, the relocation of a juvenile under such a sentence is subject to the jurisdiction of the ICJ and applications for transfer of supervision should continue to be submitted and investigated as required under the Compact.  Moreover, during the term of the sentencing order imposed by the sending state such a juvenile is subject to the rules of the Compact governing supervision of juveniles generally as provided in Chapters 4 and 5 of the ICJ Rules.

Protected health information may be disclosed for law enforcement purposes when such disclosures are required by law. The disclosure and tracking of protected health information, among authorized Compact Administrators' offices, concerning any juvenile subject to Compact supervision pursuant to court order, as required by the Compact and its authorized rules would be exempt from HIPAA.

An undocumented immigrant who meets the definition of “Juvenile” under Article II (H) of the Compact and ICJ Rule 1-101, and seeks to transfer under the Compact and ICJ Rules, is subject to the jurisdiction of the Compact.  While such person’s status as an “undocumented” immigrant would not necessarily disqualify an immigrant from transferring under the Compact, the applicable rules may result in the denial of a transfer due to the inability of the immigrant to meet the criteria of the Compact in a given case. 

Based upon the referenced provisions of the U.S. Constitution and decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, in the absence of the Consent of Congress for tribes to enter into agreement with the states as members of the Interstate Compact for Juveniles, no such authority exists under which the provisions of the compact or its rules can regulate transfers of juveniles to and from sovereign tribal nations or reservation lands.

Using these well accepted rules of statutory interpretation, it is clear that because the ICJ rules do not include a special definition of the terms “same standards . . . that prevail for its own juveniles. . .” the ordinary meaning of those terms leads to the inevitable conclusion that as the supervising State, Pennsylvania is thus permitted, under Rule 5-101(1), to impose ‘graduated sanctions’ upon any juvenile transferred under the compact if such standards are also applied to its own delinquent juveniles.

As in most states counties are specifically classified and recognized as political subdivisions of the State of Idaho.See for example Bonneville County v. Ysursa, 129 P.3d 1213 (Id. 2005); also Sanchez v. State Department of Corrections, 141 P.3d 1108 (Id. 2006) which unequivocally recognize that a county is a political subdivision of the State. As a consequence the above ICJ provisions and authority apply equally and coextensively to all Idaho counties as political subdivisions. Thus, the failure of a county to comply with the provisions of the ICJ and its duly authorized rules is tantamount to a violation by the State of Idaho and a default in its obligations under the compact and authorized rules.